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Abstract 
We  distinguish between strong and weak cognitive neuro- 
psychology, with the former attempting to  provide  direct in- 
sights into the nature of  information processing and the latter 
having the more modest goal of  providing constraints on such 
theories. We argue that strong cognitive neuropsychology, al- 
though possible, is  unlikely to succeed and that  researchers 
will fare better  by  combining behavioral, computational, and 
neural investigations. Arguments offered by Caramazza (1992) 
in  defense of strong neuropsychology  are analyzed, and  ex- 
amples are offered to illustrate the power of  alternative points 
of  view. 
INTRODUCTION 
Is cognitive neuropsychology possible? Of  course it  is 
possible; nobody we know ever claimed otherwise. But 
that  is  not  saying  much-almost  anything  is  possible. 
Rather than asking whether  cognitive neuropsychology 
is possible, we should ask whether the goals of  cognitive 
neuropsychology are plausible given the methods it uses. 
Cognitive  neuropsychologists  aim  to understand  “the 
structure of  normal perceptual, motor, and cognitive pro- 
cesses” (pp. 80-81).’  A theory of  the structure of  such 
information processing  systems posits  component pro- 
cesses (such as, in the case of  reading, a letter-to-sound 
conversion process) and structures (such as a buffer that 
holds  graphemic  information  temporarily), which  are 
understood in part by specifying the properties of  rep- 
resentations  that  reside  in  the structures  and are pro- 
duced  and  manipulated  by  processes.  Cognitive 
neuropsychologists focus on observing selective deficits 
in  behavior  that occur after brain damage, and use the 
patterns  of  associated  and dissociated  deficits to  draw 
inferences about the nature of  normal human informa- 
tion processing. 
Cognitive neuropsychologists focus almost entirely on 
patterns  of  functional  deficits-unlike  cognitive neuro- 
scientists, they do not rely on facts about the brain when 
drawing their  inferences about  normal processing. We 
argue that patterns of  deficits are simply too undercon- 
straining to allow one to draw strong inferences about 
the underlying processing system. To be clear about our 
claims, we must distinguish between two variants of  cog- 
nitive  neuropsychology.  Weak cognitive  neuropsychol- 
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ogy is  the study of  the behavior of  normal and brain- 
damaged  individuals to  constrain  theories  of  normal 
cognitive processing. On this view, the “principal or only 
aim [of cognitive neuropsychology] is to constrain theo- 
ries of  normal cognitive functioning through the analysis 
of  acquired disorders  of  cognition” (p. 81). We  brook 
no argument with  this  enterprise.* Unquestionably, to 
fully understand a working system one must understand 
the ways  in which  it can fail. Cognitive neuropsychol- 
ogical  data  clearly can  serve to  constrain  theories of 
cognition and can be a source of  inspiration for theoriz- 
ing about the structure of  normal cognition.3 
In contrast, strong  cognitive neuropsychology  is  the 
study of  the behavior of  normal and brain-damaged in- 
dividuals with the goal of  infewing the structure of  nor- 
mal  cognitive processing.  In  this  case, the goal  is “to 
draw inferences about the structure of  normal cognitive 
processes” (p. 80) and “to develop and evaluate theories 
of  normal  cognition” (p. 86).* Our argument is  with 
the goals of strong cognitive neuropsychology. Although 
Caramazza  (1992)  often  focuses  on  weak  cognitive 
neuropsychology (which is easily defended) in his dis- 
cussion, his use of  data from patient NG-and  much of 
the literature in the relevant journals-is  an example of 
strong cognitive neuropsychology; the goal  is to  infer 
features of  the processing system by  observing behav- 
ioral disruptions following brain damage.5 
The issue comes down to the following question: Can 
patterns of  performance following brain damage in and 
of  themselves reveal the nature of  human (or other bi- 
ological) information processing? Our argument is that 
strong cognitive neuropsychology is a discipline perched 
Journal  of  Cognitiue Neuroscience Volume 4, Number I perilously on a one-legged stool. It is certainlyposible 
to sit on a one-legged stool, but its instability makes it 
too easy to shift positions. Why take the risk of  falling off 
such a stool when it is so easy to add more legs, in the 
form of information about the neural substrate and ex- 
plicit computational models of  neural information proc- 
essing? Which would you rather sit on, a one-legged or 
a three-legged stool? 
Kosslyn and Van Kleeck (1990) argued that strong cog- 
nitive neuropsychology is unlikely to succeed, but noted 
that both neuropsychological data and normal behavioral 
data play  a  valuable  role as  constraints  on theories6 
Kosslyn  and Van  Kleecks argument hinged  in  part  on 
the view that the brain  is  a highly nonlinear, dynamic 
system-not  a  collection  of  isolated, discrete  compo- 
nents. Neural subsystems are intimately interconnected, 
and  hence many factors affect what  a patient can  and 
cannot accomplish following brain damage. For example, 
brain damage not only disrupts the processes carried out 
by  damaged tissue, but  also may  disrupt  connections, 
provide  spurious  inputs to  (or “shock’) remote  intact 
tissue, result in a decrease in “activation” (and so more 
difficult tasks cannot be performed), and so on. These 
indirect disruptions may lead to  various  types of  com- 
pensations and possibly the development of  new proc- 
esses,  which  change  the  behavior-sometimes 
producing the appearance of  a deficit and at other times 
masking actual deficits.’ 
Much of  Caramazza’s  (1992) discussion is a defense of 
weak cognitive neuropsychology, and we agree with this 
defense (as did Kosslyn & Van  Kleeck, 1990). However, 
he  also  defends  strong  neuropsychology,  repeatedly 
appealing to  several  general  lines of  argument in  his 
discussion.8 We  avoid  redundancy  by  not  considering 
each of  his points individually (many are closely related), 
but instead speak to  his more general themes. We first 
consider these lines of  defense, illustrating our points 
with several types of  examples, and then apply our ob- 
servations to  the findings  Caramazza (1992) uses to  il- 
lustrate how patterns of  behavior following brain damage 
can lead one to infer facts about cognitive function.9 
LOGIC OF INFERENCE 
The  likelihood  that  strong  cognitive  neuropsychology 
can succeed depends on certain assumptions, many of 
which we find implausible. These assumptions are dis- 
cussed in this section. In each case, we review Caramaz- 
za’s (1992) position before offering our response. 
The Fractionation and Transparency 
Assumptions 
Caramazza writes that  “Intuitively, we can assume that 
impaired  performance (P*) has the same relation to  a 
model of  the damaged cognitive system (M“) as that of 
normal performance (P) to the normal cognitive system 
(M)” (p. 81). Caramazza writes that  “there are various 
background  assumptions that are supposed to motivate 
the  use  of  particular  performance  measures  .  ,  . for 
inferring the functioning of  the system(s)  assumed to 
support cognitive performance, whether impaired (P* + 
M“) or normal (P -+  M).” (p. 81). Here it seems that one 
is to translate the arrow as indicating “is used to infer”- 
thus, (P* +  M“) can be translated as “impaired perform- 
ance is used to infer a model of  the damaged cognitive 
system.” Finally, he defines Li as a “functional” lesion.’O 
Therefore, the translation  table for Caramazza’s formal- 
ism thus far is as follows: 
impaired performance (P*) 
model of  the damaged cognitive system (M”) 
normal performance (P) 
normal cognitive system (M) 
a functional lesion (Li  ) 
is used to infer (4) 
And his formalized argument runs as follows: 
(P* -+  M“) 
W=M+L, 
P*+M  + L, 
This  formalism  helps to  explicate two  fundamental 
assumptions, both of which are necessary to infer com- 
ponents of  the normal system from patterns of  behavioral 
dysfunction.  The fvactionation  assumption  states  that 
“brain damage can result in the selective impairment of 
components of  cognitive processing” (Caramazza, 1984, 
p. 10). These components are defined by functional anal- 
yses. Thus, the term L, refers to one processing compo- 
nent,  Lj  to  another,  and  so  on.  The  transparency 
assumption  “essentially states that the cognitive system 
of  a brain-damaged patient is fundamentally the same as 
that of  a normal subject except for a ‘local’  modification 
of  the system” (Caramazza, 1986, p. 52). Note that these 
assumptions  are necessary  only  if  one is  engaged  in 
strong cognitive  neuropsychology, seeking  to  use  the 
data to  induce the underlying structure of  the normal 
system. Neither assumption is necessary to use patterns 
of  behavior in brain-damaged patients as constraints on 
theory  (as will be illustrated  shortly with  the case of 
patient RV). 
Response 
The fractionation assumption has two  parts. The first is 
the claim that brain  damage can selectively impair dif- 
ferent sorts of  processing. The mere fact that the brain 
is  not a homogeneous structure, with different  regions 
having different input/output connections, suggests that 
this is true (see Chapter 2 of  Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). 
However, given the interconnectivity of  neural structures 
(see below), damage rarely  (if  ever) will  affect only a 
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second is the claim that damage affects components de- 
fined by “functional analyses.” This is difficult to dispute, 
given  that  “functional analyses” can  characterize many 
types of information processing. However, if functional 
analyses are based on common sense, linguistic theory, 
or some other behaviorally based inferences, there is no 
reason to accept this assumption. Components of  behav- 
ior need not correspond to components of  processing. 
In addition, the transparency assumption seems pat- 
ently false, implying that disrupted behavior reflects only 
the missing contribution  of  a damaged  module. Brain 
function typically is nonlinear, and so models that assume 
simple additive effects are unlikely to  be accurate (cf. 
McClelland, 1979). This  nonlinearity  arises  from  basic 
properties  of  the brain’s anatomy  and physiology. For 
example, the vast majority of  connections between cort- 
ical  areas  are reciprocal, with  connections  running  in 
each direction (Felleman & Van  Essen, 1991; Van  Essen, 
1985). This architecture indicates that processing in mul- 
tiple  areas is  intimately intertwined, and so  damaging 
one area disrupts inputs to other areas. Damage affects 
the system as a whole, not isolated components. (These 
patterns of  connections make sense if input is often noisy 
or ambiguous, and “cooperative computation” is used to 
overcome these problems; for a discussion, see Kosslyn 
& Koenig, 1992.) 
Furthermore, behavior following  brain  damage may 
reflect not the effects of  a missing or impaired module, 
but rather the fact that processes  are not  interacting in 
the usual way. To be concrete, consider the findings of 
Kosslyn, McPeek, Daly, Alpert, and Caviness (1991~)  on 
patient RV,  who had a lesion in the left  frontal lobe. In 
an MRI  scan, it appeared likely that this lesion disrupted 
the inferior  longitudinal  fasciculus, which would  have 
de-enervated posterior  regions of  the left hemisphere. 
And  in fact, a PET  scan revealed a large region of  hypo- 
metabolism  in the left  occipitotemporal area. This ana- 
tomical and physiological information suggested that RV 
might have a deficit in encoding “object properties,” such 
as shape (which are known to be encoded in the “ven- 
tral,” temporal lobe-based system; see Maunsell & New- 
some, 1987; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko,  1983, for 
reviews). However, this damage did not  affect, directly 
or indirectly, the areas known to be involved in encoding 
“spatial properties,” such as location (which are thought 
to  be encoded in  the “dorsal,” parietal-lobe based sys- 
tem). In fact, RV  showed a visual deficit: Unlike control 
subjects, he required progressively more time to encode 
more complex shapes that were formed by filling in cells 
of  4  X  5 grids. Not only did he require more time to 
determine whether  two  sequentially  presented  stimuli 
were the same or different when they incorporated more 
cells,  but  also  required  more time  simply  to  decide 
whether  an  X  mark fell  on or off  the more complex 
shapes. The deficit in both tasks disappeared when the 
internal grid lines were removed. 
At first glance, it might be tempting to suspect that RV 
had a deficit in encoding visual “features,” such as lines 
and vertices, and the grid lines simply overloaded this 
impaired module. Such an inference would follow from 
the fractionation and transparency assumptions. But con- 
sider how such an inference fares in light of  additional 
findings: When the grid lines were removed, RV did not 
require less time overall to match sequentially presented 
patterns than he did when they were in grids. Further- 
more, when random noise elements were placed  over 
patterns that were not in grids, he did not require more 
time for more complex patterns; the lines had to form 
an orderly array of  grid cells to define sets of  locations 
before the complexity effect was observed. Neither result 
makes sense if  RV simply had an impaired “feature en- 
coding” module. 
In contrast, these results  are as expected if the grids 
defined sets of  locations (the cells), and the intact parietal 
lobe-based  spatial  encoding  mechanisms  encoded 
shapes  as  sets  of  locations  of  filled  cells-and  more 
locations require more time to  encode. There was no 
increase in time with increasing stimulus complexity for 
a control group, which suggests that in  normal people 
this  location  coding  process  requires  more time  than 
simply encoding a shape, and so its outputs do not end 
up being used to perform shape comparison tasks. How- 
ever, in RV, the damage slowed down his temporal lobe- 
based  shape encoding mechanisms, which  caused  the 
output of  the slower but still effective spatial encoding 
system to be used when a grid was available. 
Other accounts of  these findings are possible, but this 
one  has the advantage of  being consistent with facts about 
the brain and computational analyses (see Chapter 3 of 
Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). Our point here is not to argue 
for this particular explanation, but rather to illustrate how 
a different perspective-viewing  a patient’s deficit as re- 
flecting an alteration of  the “ecological balance” of  the 
processing system-can  lead one to collect data that are 
not easily explained as the missing contribution of  one 
or more individual  components. We  are not trying to 
engage in strong cognitive neuropsychology, but rather 
are treating  these results  as constraints  on theorizing: 
Whatever the ultimate  account  of  these  findings,  they 
suggest that deficits should be understood as alterations 
of  a system of  interacting  components, not as  isolated, 
local modifications of  the normal system, which other- 
wise continues to  operate normally. The intact compo- 
nents do not necessarily contribute to behavior normally, 
as implied by Caramazza’s formalism. 
In addition, there is evidence that the brain  at least 
sometimes actually reorganizes following brain damage 
(e.g., Jacobs & Donoghue, 1991; Merzenich, Kaas, Wall, 
Nelson, Sur, & Felleman, 1983; Merzenich, Nelson, Stry- 
ker, Cynader, Schoppman, & Zook, 1984;  Pons, Garraghty, 
Ommaya, Kaas, Taub, & Mishkin, 1991). Caramazza de- 
cries this possibility, suggesting that  if  it  is true then it 
will be impossible to engage in (strong) cognitive neuro- 
98  Journal of  Cognitive Neuroscience  Volume 4, Number  1 ory, which directs them to focus on specific aspects of 
the phenomena.  They know  that  these  measurements 
will allow them to answer certain questions because they 
can rely on a host of  background assumptions that are 
embedded in a rigorous and well-articulated theoretical 
framework. In cognitive neuropsychology the goal is to 
construct the very sort of theory that is a prerequisite for 
using the  cloud  chamber. In  our case, we  cannot be 
certain whether  overall speed, speed of  initiating the 
response, force of  responding, overall accuracy, variabil- 
ity in accuracy over trials, and so on are the appropriate 
measures (e.g.,  see &rams  & Balota, 1991). If  some other 
measure were used, the “intact”  ability might not appear 
so intact. For example, if one only examines errors, one 
might give a clean bill of  health to a patient who takes 
10 times longer than normal to respond. To be concrete, 
if  Caramazza and Hillis (1991) had measured response 
times, they might have found that their patients required 
abnormal  times  for  nouns-which  would  have  chal- 
lenged  the  inference that verbs are  represented  in  a 
distinct structure. 
Data  Underdetermine Theory 
Cognitive neuropsychologists  acknowledge that there are 
many  possible theories or hypotheses that can account 
for observed behavioral data. However, one could argue 
that this is  not a special feature of  cognitive neuropsy- 
chology. Rather, there are always alternate theories that 
could account for any empirical observations, and the 
induction from the behavior of  brain-damaged individ- 
uals to a correct theory of  normal cognitive processing 
is no more problematic than the induction of any theory 
from any type of  observation. 
Response 
Although  the  induction of  theory from data  is  always 
problematic  and underdetermined, this is  a matter of 
degree.  It  is  one thing to  be  working within  a well- 
established framework in which questions can be cast 
and observations interpreted, and quite something else 
to be  working in a field where the  basic structure of 
theories is at issue. (Consider the amount that could have 
been learned from cloud chambers-let  alone response 
times to  visual  stimuli-in  the  third  century A.D.) In 
some branches of  physics, it is difficult to produce even 
one  plausible  competing  account  for  an  empirical 
finding. 
In  contrast, it  is  easy to  generate  many  alternative 
accounts for results in  cognitive neuropsychology, and 
these accounts may rest on assumptions at different levels 
of  analysis (ranging from aspects of  the task or instruc- 
tions to the amount of  effort to produce the response). 
One  advantage of  trying to  understand  the  nature  of 
information  processing  and  brain  mechanisms at  the 
same time is that brain mechanisms are constrained by 
the laws of physics, and so alternative accounts of  mech- 
anisms are difficult to formulate. For example, it is  dif- 
ficult to produce more than one credible explanation of 
how a neuron fires. 
Caramazza’s argument is a little like pointing out that 
one can slip and break one’s neck in the shower or by 
walkmg on a tightrope, and thereby concluding that both 
practices are equally dangerous. Although both risks ex- 
ist, they  differ by  a matter of  degree. In  this analogy, 
physics is like taking a shower: there is only a small risk 
that one will come to a bad end because the danger is 
highly restricted and easy to control. 
Descriptions of Deficits Are Theory-Related 
The way we characterize a deficit depends on our theory, 
but this is true for any scientific observation and “we are 
still led to  ask whether the implications of  this fact are 
particularly problematic for cognitive neuropsychology.” 
(P. 87) 
Response 
Our response parallels our previous one; it is a matter 
of degree. To the extent that a rigorous theoretical frame- 
work does not already exist, one has many degrees of 
freedom when describing data. Thus, although this factor 
affects all sciences, it is  particularly troublesome when 
the essential elements of  a theory are in dispute. 
THE PRACTICAL VERSUS THE POSSIBLE 
Much of medicine is based on pragmatic considerations. 
If  a drug works, it is used-even if its mechanism is not 
understood, or if theory suggests that it should not work. 
Caramazza argues that (strong) cognitive neuropsychol- 
ogy seems to be working, so possible logical objections 
should be put aside. We  consider these claims in this 
section. 
Pragmatics as a Guide 
Caramazza recommends that we should not be guided 
by  logic alone, but  rather: “The justification is strictly 
pragmatic: we are justified in using the performance of 
brain-damaged subjects to infer the structure of  normal 
cognition if, inpuctice, these inferences lead to signifi- 
cant insight into the nature of normal cognitive process- 
ing” (p. 82). He further claims that it  is “an empirical 
matter that  cannot be decided by  logic alone. Conse- 
quently, the justification for undertaking the enterprise 
must ultimately be based on pragmatic considerations: 
that is, on considerations about the productivity of  the 
enterprise  in  generating  significant  insights  into  the 
problems  it  has  chosen to  address” (p. 89). In  other 
words, even though there is no ironclad logical reason 
that performance measures of brain-damaged individuals 
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if these performance measures seem to work in practice 
then we should accept them. 
Response 
How does one decide whether this strong cognitive neu- 
ropsychology enterprise is “working”?  It is easy to argue 
gether could occur if the tasks require similar amounts 
of “activation,”  are indirectly affected by spurious inputs 
from another  region, or require additional blood flow 
either to or through a single damaged locus. Or it could 
reflect the complexity of  the instructions, the effort re- 
quired to generate a response, and so forth (see Kosslyn 
& Koenig, 1992). 
THE AUTONOMY OF FUNCTIONAL 
ANALYSES 
that  very  few  insights  about  normal  cognition  have 
emerged solely from studies of  brain-damaged patients. 
Indeed, without explicit computational models, or clear 
relations to neuroanatomy or neurophysiology, it is dif- 
ficult to know how to determine when progress has been 
made; it is too easy to wave one’s arms around and rely 
on the vagueness of  natural language when explaining a 
finding. 
Strong cognitive neuropsychology rests on the assump- 
tion that one can infer the nature of  cognitive functions 
independently of  considerations about the brain or of 
detailed models of  computational systems. We are skep- 
tical, for the reasons noted below. 
Coherent Patterns of Performance  Neural Reality 
Even  though it is  not logically necessary, coherent pat- 
terns of  performance following brain damage appear to 
offer insight into the structure of  cognitive processing. 
For example, when deficits tend to cluster, this seems to 
suggest that they share a common underlying processing 
component. “The guarantees we have are strictly prag- 
matic in nature. They spring from the fact that the per- 
formance  of  brain-damaged  subjects  appears  to  be 
patterned  in  a  coherent  fashion, and  investigation of 
these patterns of  performance seems to lead to interesting 
insights about  normal  cognitions” (p. 85).  Caramazza 
notes that  in clinical neurology it  “was repeatedly ob- 
served that, with  notable frequency, brain  damage re- 
sulted in highly specific cognitive,  perceptual, and motor 
deficits” (p. 89). 
Response 
We  do not  dispute  that behavior can be disrupted  in 
orderly ways.  The issue is  whether one can  infer the 
underlying functional bases for such patterns of  disrup- 
tion solely by  observing behavior. Even if tasks that are 
impaired together share a common processing compo- 
nent, this component might bear an abstract relation to 
the observed behavioral  deficit. Neural network com- 
puter simulations have shown that tasks can be accom- 
plished  using  representations  that  are  not  intuitively 
obvious. For  example, Lehky  and  Sejnowski (1988a,b) 
trained a network to extract shape from variations in the 
shading of  a surface, and found that it developed “end- 
stopped” hidden units; presumably, if  these units were 
damaged, the network would be impaired at extracting 
shape from shading. Armed with  this hypothesis, one 
could look for a deficit in detecting termini of  lines in 
patients who have trouble deriving shape from shading. 
But one would probably never infer such an “implausi- 
ble” mechanism on the basis of  the behavioral data alone. 
Moreover, the fact that deficits sometimes cluster to- 
Cognitive neuropsychologists do not focus on how func- 
tions are realized in neural hardware. Furthermore, Car- 
amazza argues that we should not require theories of 
cognitive processing to be neurally accurate because if 
we were to adopt this “stringent criterion for determin- 
ing the level of  interest in a cognitive theory, we would 
have to consider as of  ‘little interest’ the vast majority of 
cognitive neuropsychological research, seeing as most of 
it is  concerned with complex cognitive functions (e.g., 
language) for which at  this time there is not much de- 
tailed information at the neural level” (p. 87). 
Response 
A given behavior is produced by one sequence of  infor- 
mation processing, and not others. There is a “fact of  the 
matter;” some theories are correct, and others are incor- 
rect. The demonstration that a theory is “computationally 
adequate” is a necessary but not sufficient measure of  its 
veracity; we also want evidence that those processes are 
actually carried out by the brain. If the theories of  cog- 
nitive processing that are formulated by cognitive neu- 
ropsychologists do not reflect the way the brain works, 
then  they  are  of  little value  for  cognitive  science or 
neuroscience (although they may be of  interest in arti- 
ficial intelligence). In many cases, we do not yet know 
whether the brain embodies the distinctions of  specific 
theories, but in our view this is not simply icing on the 
cake: Researchers should seek to determine the neuro- 
logical reality of  their putative functional distinctions.  The 
function being described is, after all, the function of  the 
brain, not of  the big toe or some other organ. 
Thus, drawing inferences about function without re- 
gard to the brain will, at best, provide only some of  the 
information needed to evaluate a theory of  human (or 
other biological) information processing. Our point is 
simple: The hypotheses and theories that are generated 
by  cognitive neuropsychologists are of  little  interest if 
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rigorously solely by considering behavior. 
Computational Models 
It  is not clear to some “how reliance on explicit theory 
would  overcome the putative defects of  neuropsychol- 
ogical research” (p. 91). Indeed, “if  it were to  turn out 
that brain  damage does in  fact  create  ‘new functions,’ 
then,  no matter  how  detailed  our  cognitive  theories 
might be, the performance  of  brain-damaged  subjects 
could  not  be of  use  in  constraining  normal  theory” 
(pp. 91-92). 
Response 
The brain is a dynamic system, and real-time interactions 
among component processes can be modeled on a com- 
puter. Analyses of  how to build a model that can mimic 
specific behavior is one source of  hypotheses about proc- 
essing, and actually building computational models can 
help one to discover the empirical implications of  one’s 
ideas-which  are not always clear when one is dealing 
with complex nonlinear systems; static, linear formalisms 
are  likely to  have  limited  use  in understanding  brain 
function. Computational models are particularly useful 
because they allow one to simulate complex properties 
of  the brain, and use these properties as constraints on 
theories of  information processing.”  For example, Kos- 
slyn, Flynn, Amsterdam, and Wang (1990) implemented 
a model of  visual object identification that is organized 
in terms of  the major pathways of  high-level vision. This 
model can be damaged, allowing one to anticipate effects 
of  disconnections, compensations, and so forth. As  noted 
earlier, predictions  from computational models can be 
very nonintuitive. 
In  addition, computational  models can  help one to 
discern what sorts of  new functions could emerge fol- 
lowing damage; such functions do not magically appear 
out of  whole cloth, but arise within the contexf  of  the 
surviving aspects of the system (cf. Pearson et al., 1987). 
Computational models can help one to understand what 
sorts  of  new  functions  might  arise  following  specific 
types of  damage-and  so can generate empirically test- 
able  hypotheses.  Indeed,  a  weak  cognitive  neuro- 
psychological approach is particularly useful when one 
has a computer model: If  the model cannot account for 
relevant observed phenomena, it must be ruled out.’* 
THE LIMITS OF STRONG COGNITIVE 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: AN EXAMPLE 
In  discussing the case of  patient NG, Caramazza avers 
that although Kosslyn and Van  Kleecks  criticisms may 
sound plausible in the abstract, they carry no force when 
confronted with  actual data. Caramazza’s discussion  of 
NG  is a good example of  the strong cognitive neuro- 
psychological stance; he  clearly wants to draw inferences 
about an underlying processing system in normal people 
based on the patient’s Performance per se. Our objec- 
tions to this practice are illustrated  by his use of  these 
data. 
Patient NG  was a left-handed woman who apparently 
had a lesion of  the left parietal white matter and the left 
anterior basal ganglia, adjacent to the head of  the caudate. 
She neglected  (ignored)  the ends of  words no matter 
how they were oriented  in  space: If  the words were 
vertical, she ignored their bottoms; if they were mirror- 
reversed, she ignored letters at the left side, and so on. 
She also ignored the final letters of  words when they 
were spelled aloud. Similarly, she tended to make errors 
at the end of  words when spelling them aloud or  writing 
them. From these and similar results, Caramazza draws 
four conclusions, none of  which necessarily follows from 
the data he presents. 
We begin with Caramazza’s second conclusion, which 
lies at the heart of  his claims, namely that the findings 
rule out deficits at “retinocentric and stimulus-centered 
levels of  representation” and instead  demonstrate  the 
existence of  a “word-centered’ representation. But this 
conclusion does not necessarily follow, for it is possible 
that the problem has to do not with the representation 
of  words or other stimuli, but rather with the processing 
of  this  information.  Caramazza wonders how  it would 
matter  whether  a  function  is  implemented  in a  small 
group of  nearby  neurons or distributed  widely. One 
answer is that  if  we assume that processes  are imple- 
mented  by  widely distributed  neurons, degraded  per- 
formance-not  the  all-or-none  presence  of  a 
component-should  be the rule following brain damage 
because (as Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck noted) a lesion is 
unlikely to  obliterate all of  the relevant  neurons. With 
this in mind, first consider the fact that the left  parietal 
lobe was damaged. The parietal lobes are known to be 
critically involved  in  computing  spatial  properties  of 
stimuli and have a critical role in directing attention (for 
reviews see Andersen,  1987; Posner  & Petersen,  1990; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Humans apparently en- 
code  each  letter  of  a  word  separately  when  reading, 
scanning  from the beginning of  the word to  the end 
(Just & Carpenter, 1980, 1987). The damage may have 
impaired  NG’s ability to estimate distances properly- 
leading  her to underestimate  the amount of  scanning 
that is required to encode an entire word. If  so, then- 
like normal subjects-she  encodes the letters one at a 
time from the beginning of  the word, but fails to scan 
far enough to encode them all when reading the whole 
word. Such scanning of  the overall pattern  is  not nec- 
essary to read the letters one at a time (which she could 
do). The data suggest that she underestimates a relatively 
constant percentage of  the length, not a fixed amount. 
This  scanning  operation  would  occur  over  a  viewer- 
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the retinotopically  mapped  areas  of  the occipital  lobe 
(see Felleman & Van  Essen, 1991). 
But what about NG’s failure to decode orally spelled 
words? If  NG  performs this task by visualizing the word 
as  it is  spelled, then these results  are easily explained. 
Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) review much data indicating 
that visual mental imagery shares processing mechanisms 
with visual perception. Thus, the scanning deficit evident 
in perception would also disrupt her ability to scan vi- 
sualized words. Kosslyn, Alpert, Maljkovic, Weiss, Thomp- 
son, Hamilton, and Chabris (1991a) used PET scanning 
to study the brain  bases of  visual mental  imagery, and 
found that primary visual cortex is  selectively activated 
during imagery. The fact that this area is retinotopically 
mapped in humans (Fox et al., 1986) is consistent with 
our view that the representation underlying  NG’s  per- 
formance was not word-centered. 
Finally, what about the fact that NG’s written and oral 
spelling also revealed neglect of  the right halves of  the 
words? One account of  this finding is that NG  visualized 
the words prior to writing or orally spelling them. Nor- 
mal  people report doing this for “difficult” words, pre- 
sumably in an effort to  reconstruct  information that is 
not strongly represented in memory. NG  has brain dam- 
age, and so she may visualize words in general-even 
ones normal people would not call “difficult”-prior  to 
spelling them. 
Alternatively, another account hinges on the observa- 
tion that NG’s striatum apparently was compromised. If 
we can generalize from the macaque monkey to humans, 
this structure plays a critical role in habitual  behavior 
(e.g., see Mishkin & Appenzeller, 1987). One aspect of 
reading  may be a habit, namely estimating how many 
letters must be scanned across before beginning to read 
a word; other sequential tasks are “set up” in advance, 
before the process  is actually initiated  (e.g., see Stern- 
berg, Monsell, Knoll, & Wright, 1978). Thus, the scanning 
problem could  arise  from  a  disruption of  this  “habit” 
system. 
As yet another alternative, NG’s problems may reflect 
a decrease in the “capacity” of  a process that allocates 
“effort”  for performing sequential tasks. It is possible that 
there is a process that uses preattentive information to 
allocate  capacity for  shifting  attention.  If  this  process 
were realized  in a small number of  neurons that were 
widely distributed,  it  might  become degraded but  not 
entirely  dysfunctional.  Hence,  it  would  simply  fail  to 
allocate enough processing capacity (however defined), 
and scanning would fall short. If  such a process were 
shown to be highly localized, or to involve many, redun- 
dant neurons, this conjecture would seem implausible. 
Caramazza and Hillis’ (1990a,b) findings are difficult 
to evaluate for a number of  reasons. First and foremost, 
they apparently did not collect response times. It is very 
difficult to  interpret  error rates without  also knowing 
how long the subject needed to respond, if only because 
it  is possible that there were speedaccuracy tradeoffs: 
NG  may have responded more quickly than age-matched 
control subjects with lesions of  similar size in other areas 
(which would control for the general slowing typically 
observed following brain damage), perhaps because she 
was anxious about being tested, was trying to please the 
experimenter, failed to estimate properly the amount of 
necessary processing before  responding, and so on. If 
so, then she may not have allowed herself enough time 
to scan across the entire word before responding. Sec- 
ond, from the perspective of  our accounts, it would have 
been useful to measure the time NG needed to speak or 
write each letter of  a word. If  progressively more time 
were taken toward the end of  the word, this might sug- 
gest that NG  “ran out of  steam” too soon, not properly 
estimating  the difficulty of  the task. It  would  also be 
useful to  collect  such data  from control subjects;  it  is 
possible that  NG  simply has  an exaggerated  case of  a 
condition that appears commonly as the brain degrades 
with age. Moreover, if  she required more time to read 
words when the letters were spread apart, this would be 
consistent with the scanning notion developed above. It 
is clear that Caramazza’s theoretical preconceptions led 
him to collect some data and not others, and the available 
data are consistent with numerous alternative accounts. 
Knowledge of  how function  is  implemented  in  the 
brain could play a critical role in discriminating among 
the various alternative hypotheses we have offered: Once 
we know something about the function carried out by a 
particular part of  the brain, we can apply that knowledge 
to  understanding the deficits of  patients with lesions in 
that  area.  In  addition, depending on how  function  is 
implemented, an account  that  posits that a  lesion  has 
directly affected a single function is more or less plau- 
sible. Information about how function is implemented 
in  neural  tissue  is  invaluable  if  we are to  distinguish 
among the many possible alternative accounts for any set 
of  behavioral dysfunctions following brain damage. 
Now  let us consider the other three conclusions Car- 
amazza draws on the basis of  behavioral  dysfunctions 
following brain damage. 
Conclusion I  is that NG’s impairment is at “a level of 
processing that specifies the identity and order of  gra- 
phemes (abstract letter identities) and not specific letter 
shapes” (pp. 83-84).  The alternatives above all posit that 
viewer-centered  representations of  specific shapes are 
used. Hence, this conclusion does not necessarily follow. 
Conclusion 3  hinges  on the fact that  other patients 
have been studied who always neglect stimuli in the left 
visual field, and so neglect different parts of  words when 
they  are presented  normally  than when they are pre- 
sented mirror-reversed (e.g., see Behrmann, Moscovitch, 
Black, & Mozer, 1990). Caramazza wants to conclude that 
there  is  therefore  “a distinction  between  a  canonical, 
word-centered’’  and a “stimulus-centered’  representation 
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visual field, and the deficit is not specific to words. But 
more importantly, these findings may simply suggest that 
scanning mechanisms can be  disrupted  in  more  than 
one way (see Chapter 5 of  Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). 
Finally, Conclusion 4 is that NG’s deficit concerns the 
“right half  of  a grapheme representation” (p. 84). We 
note in Figure 1 of  Caramazza’s article that this patient 
also neglected the right half  of  some types of  objects, 
which suggests that the deficit was not restricted to the 
right side of  graphemic representations per se. 
Caramazza then goes on to  “summarize” his conclu- 
sions in  a model of  the component processes used in 
normal word  recognition. This  model posits  three in- 
dependent levels of  representation. The first level, a  feu- 
ture map, consists of  a “retinocentric description of  the 
edges in a retinally projected image.” It is unclear how 
the data led to this conclusion, and we suspect that he 
is  borrowing ideas from other types of  research (com- 
putational modeling and neurophysiology) to formulate 
this idea. The second level, the letter-shape  map, appears 
to be a viewer-centered description of  the shapes and 
spatial relations among letters. Although he claims that 
this representation is  analogous to Marr’s 2.5-D sketch, 
it is  unclear whether this claim should be taken at face 
value: Marr’s representation  did not have explicit rep- 
resentations of  edge boundaries; rather, it was a depth 
map, which used a “pin cushion” representation to make 
explicit properties of  surfaces. Moreover, Caramazza ap- 
pears to posit explicit representations of  the spatial re- 
lations among letters, which  also was  not a feature of 
Marr’s 2.5-D representations. Indeed, there is good evi- 
dence that this level of  representation does not specify 
spatial relations explicitly, given that monkeys who have 
intact occipital and temporal lobes (the probable loci of 
this functional representation) but missing parietal lobes 
have  impaired representation  of  spatial relations (e.g., 
see Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Furthermore, we have 
seen no evidence for a distinct representation for letter 
shapes per se; indeed, Caramazza’s own logic of  infer- 
ence  (P* -+ M  + &) seems  to  suggest that  a  single 
nonlinguistic processing component has been damaged, 
given that the patient’s deficits also affect nonlinguistic 
stimuli. (He could suggest that there are two  functional 
lesions here, but we see no grounds for this inference.) 
Fjnally, consider the third level, the grapheme descrip- 
tion. Caramazza says, “In order to account for the results 
obtained with  NG  we  must  assume the  hypothesized 
distinction between the latter two  levels of  representa- 
tions: NG  has a spatially specific deficit at the level of  the 
grapheme description and not at the level of  the letter- 
shape map” (p. 85). As we have seen, we must assume 
no such thing. 
We  found it rather striking that immediately after this 
exercise in strong cognitive neuropsychology,  Caramazza 
asks whether there are reasons for “excluding the per- 
formance of  these subjects from the range of  facts that 
may  be  relevant  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  among 
competing accounts of  the process of  word recognition” 
(p. 85). Of  course there  are not; this  is proper weak 
cognitive neuropsychology. But it is an error to confuse 
the two enterprises, as Caramazza appears to do  through- 
out  his  article. We  are  skeptical about  the  claim  that 
behavioral data from brain-damaged patients alone can 
implicate components of  a processing system, not that 
they are important constraints on all theories.’3 
CONCLUSIONS 
Caramazza argues that “behavioral observations of  brain- 
damaged subjects can stand on their own in the devel- 
opment of  a meaningful cognitive science . . . develop- 
ments in cognitive science concerning the computational 
structure of  cognitive processes can proceed indepen- 
dently of  neuroanatomical  observations” (p.  85). We 
agree. Of  course behavioral observations of  brain-dam- 
aged subjects can be conducted without regard to neu- 
roanatomy, and  such observations will  provide  useful 
constraints on theory. But these observations, standing 
on their own, are not likely to implicate a correct theory 
of  information processing. Strong cognitive neuropsy- 
chology is  a nineteenth-century endeavor, and the rea- 
sons it failed then are still with us today. To the extent 
that cognitive neuropsychology is  succeeding, it  is  be- 
cause theorists are using computational ideas or are dis- 
covering surprising phenomena. When phenomena defy 
common sense, they often imply that conventional ways 
of  conceptualizing a problem or theoretical assumptions 
are incorrect, which is always useful. Such findings place 
constraints on all theories, which must now account for 
these nonintuitive results. But, as useful as they are, such 
findings do not directly reveal the nature of  the under- 
lying mechanisms. 
Our argument is simple:  Why try to sit on a one-legged 
stool when one can use a three-legged one? In addition 
to behavioral data, computational modeling and neural 
constraints can  play  a critical role  in  helping  one to 
formulate and test theories. It is  difficult for us to  see 
how one could disagree with this observation. And  in 
fact, in  spite of  all  of  his  arguments to  the  contrary, 
Caramazza himself writes, “it is amply evident that such 
information [anatomical and neurophysiological] is fun- 
damental for any effort directed at developing and con- 
straining theories of  the functional organization of  the 
brain” (p. 92). Moreover, “a nontrivial theory of  the ‘func- 
tional organization of  the brain’ will be a theory of  the 
neural implementation of  specific cognitive processes” 
(p. 93). We couldn’t have said it better ourselves. 
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Notes 
1. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from Caramma 
(1992). 
2. Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck  stated that “studying the effects of 
brain damage is without question one source of  evidence for 
a theory of information processing” (p. 400). 
3. Caramazza  accuses Kosslyn  and Van  Kleeck of  concluding 
“that the study of  brain-damaged subjects for the purpose of 
constraining  theories  of  normal  cognitive  processing  is 
doomed to failure” (p. 85). However, Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck 
never make any  such claim. The nearest  claim they make is 
that “it is  virtually impossible to  induce a correct  theory of 
information processing simply by observing patterns of  deficits 
following brain  damage” (p. 391). Constraining theories  of 
normal cognition is a useful goal for cognitive neuropsychol- 
ogists. 
4.  Caramazza  refers  to  the  “functional  organization  of  the 
brain” (p. Sl), but it is not clear what he means by this phrase. 
Given  the focus of  cognitive neuropsychology on functional 
organization, it might be both less confusing and more accurate 
to say the “functional organization of behavior”-which  is what 
is actually being studied. It is useful to be clear on the distinc- 
tion between brain and behavior and the distinction between 
implementation and function. 
5. Caramazza  writes,  “Whatever  may  be  (Kosslyn  and  Van 
Kleecks] motivation for ascribing a naive inductivist view of 
science to cognitive neuropsychologists, it should be apparent 
that there is nothing intrinsic to cognitive neuropsychology that 
requires that one adopt this position” (p. 86). Their motivation 
was  based  on reading  journals  such  as Cognitive Neuropsy- 
cbology, Brain and Cognition, and Brain and Language-all 
of  which include a substantial number of  articles that adopt the 
strong cognitive neuropsychology approach. For example, we 
selected  a volume  of  Cognitive NeuropsyGhologv  at  random 
(1987), and  counted  the  number  of  articles that adopted  a 
strong cognitive neuropsychology approach. We evaluated each 
of  the 10 articles that reported investigations of  brain-damaged 
subjects, using a conservative criterion for “strong” cognitive 
neuropsychology, and found that 5 clearly fell in this category. 
We  agree that there is  nothing intrinsic to  the research  that 
requires this approach, but it certainly characterizes a major 
trend in the field. 
6. Caramazza  accuses  Kosslyn  and Van  Kleeck  of  making  a 
“sweeping condamation of  cognitive neuropsychological re- 
search (p. 85), but this is a misreading. Kosslyn and Van Kleeck 
argue against strong cognitive neuropsychology, and point out 
that this approach  is unlikely to  allow one to  infer a correct 
theory of  human information processing. This was not meant 
to degrade the contribution  that  can be made by  cognitive 
neuropsychologists. 
7.  Note that the only way in which deficit data can serve a role 
in  theorizing  is  by  being couched  in  terms of  deficits, and 
hence  a  characterization of  normal  operation  must precede 
deficit  research.  Without  such  a  characterization  of  normal 
functioning it is not clear what one should consider a “deficit.” 
8.  Caramazza  claims that Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck  raised two 
kinds of  points, in principle and in practice. This is a misread- 
ing: All of  the points were intended to  be in principle; more 
careful measurements will not cure problems of inference. 
9. Caramazza claims that the study of  abnormal  behavior by 
Broca, Charcot,  Jackson, and Wernicke “led to the first explicit 
and empirically defensible  claims about the relationship  be- 
tween neuroanatomy and cognitive processes” (p. 80). These 
goals are more in line with cognitive neuroscience than with 
cognitive neuropsychology; neuroanatomy almost never enters 
into discussions of  cognitive neuropsychology. Furthermore, 
relatively little that  was  discovered  by  these pioneers  is  ac- 
cepted as entirely accurate today. 
10. The concept of  a functional lesion appears at times to be 
conflated with the concept of  a structural (physical) lesion. For 
example, Caramazza refers to  “brain-damage on the cognitive 
system” and “functional lesion to the cognitive system” (p. 82). 
We know what brain damage is, and Caramazza usually uses 
“cognitive system” to  refer to  a functional description of  the 
system (as in the second quotation), but we must take care not 
to assume that the two  can be discussed with interchangeable 
terms. 
11. We are not  suggesting that all research with patients re- 
quires the use of  computer simulation models or that  these 
models are always a good idea. Computational models must 
incorporate many arbitrary details if the domain is not reason- 
ably well understood. In the initial phases of  research, it often 
is  better  to  investigate issues, trying to  discriminate  among 
alternative positions (see Kosslyn, 1980). If the issues concern 
the existence of  specific processing components, one source 
of  useful evidence is  the existence of  selective deficits. How- 
ever, given the complexity of  the issues and loose linkage from 
data to  theory, no single source of  evidence  is  compelling. 
Hence, even here we argue that a convergent, interdisciplinary 
approach is likely to be most useful. 
12. Caramazza inaccurately ascribes to Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck 
the position  that  “neuropsychological investigations that  are 
not explicitly guided by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological 
considerations cannot lead to meaningful conclusions” (p. 85) 
and “no meaningful conclusions can be reached in this area” 
(p. 87). One problem  is with the term “meaningful”:  there is 
no doubt that neuropsychological  investigations can  lead to 
meaningful  conclusions  about  the  constraints  that  a  theory 
must  respect. Another problem  is  with  the word  “lead: we 
reject  strong cognitive neuropsychology, but  advocate weak 
cognitive neuropsychology-which  may play a role in leading 
to conclusions, but does not do so in isolation. In addition, 
Caramazza writes that “Kosslyn and Van  Kleeck claim that the 
cognitive  neuropsychologist’s interest  in  neuropsychological 
data is  principally motivated by  hidher disaffection with the 
methods of  cognitive psychology” (p. 86). However, the claim 
that was actually made is that “part of  the appeal of  neuropsy- 
chology derives from disillusionment with the strictly behav- 
ioral approach.” (Kosslyn & Van  Kleeck, 1990, p. 390). 
13. It is of  interest that Caramazza chose to describe a patient 
with visuakpatial problems, rather than one of  the patients he 
has studied with language deficits. Physiological studies of  vi- 
sion and computational modeling give weight to his first con- 
clusion. If  Caramazza had  considered these other sources of 
support on an equal footing with the patient’s performance, 
this conclusion could have been defended much more strongly. 
Moreover, thinking about properties of  computational systems 
and functional anatomy might have led him to collect additional 
data (including  response  times) when he and Hillis studied 
NG, and perhaps to arrive at different conclusions. If Caramazza 
had presented other cases, such as the patients with verb pro- 
duction  deficits noted  above, we  would  have  had  an  even 
clearer example of  strong cognitive neuropsychology at work. 
Reprint  requests  should  be sent to  S. M.  Kosslyn,  Harvard 
University, 1236 William James Hall, 33  Kirkland  Street, Cam- 
bridge, MA 02138. 
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